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A focus on risk: States reconsider their environmental
priorities
Maine Policy Review Vol. 1(1): 13-27
by Richard A. Minard
Director, Northeast Center for Comparative Risk, Vermont Law School
Three political forces are colliding in most of the northeastern states like so many continental
plates: tighter state budgets, weaker business conditions, and expanding public expectations for
environmental protection. The collision is shaking the status quo and leading some policy makers
co use the "comparative risk process" as a tool to manage change. This article will explain
"comparative risk" and show how focusing on risk can help states build a more appropriate and
resilient set of environmental priorities and create more effective strategies to address them. The
article will illustrate its points with the results from state projects in Vermont, Louisiana, and
Washington, and from national and regional projects conducted by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).
So far, the record is good. Over the last five years, the EPA and the states have shown that the
comparative risk process can raise the quality of environmental policy-making - at any level
from the household to the federal government - by replacing crisis management, inertia, and
conventional wisdom with informed judgment.

Comparative risk and public policy
Seeking the best use of scarce resources
Information and judgment are the basic components of comparative risk. The process starts with
a quest to gather and to understand the best information available about the causes and
consequences of a range of environmental problems. By sticking to a fairly rigorous, systematic
approach to gathering and presenting data, participants are able to make useful comparisons
among the problems. These judgments usually take the form of a comparative ranking of the
problems in the order of the risks they pose. Figure 1 shows the final rankings of such a project
in Vermont. These rankings usually conclude a project's first phase: the comparative risk
analysis. Typically, the second phase focuses on setting priorities for action: risk management.
This article includes both phases in its definition of the comparative risk process.

Figure 1: Public Advisory Committee Ranking of Environmental Problems: 19 November
1990

Note: Problems of equal rank are listed alphabetically within their group.

Every project to date has estimated and ranked risks to human health and to the health of
ecosystems. Most projects have also tried to estimate and rank the problems' economic impact,
or, more broadly, their impact on people's quality of life.
Rarely, however, is the available information complete enough or well enough understood to be
taken as indisputable scientific fact. Thus the analysis inevitably ends with personal judgments
based on the data and shaped by the participants' values. In other words, the process starts with
hard science and ends with something far more value-laden and political.
Some people dismiss the utility of comparative risk when they discover that it isn't and can't be
purely scientific. Others charge that the very notion of comparing environmental problems,
ranking risks, and setting priorities for action is somehow immoral and counterproductive.
Government should be solving all problems, they say. These objections miss the point: decisionmakers at every level set priorities every day. Too often, they do so without much information
and without carefully choosing the criteria they use to make judgments. The results can be
misdirected and wasteful policies.
Good information and good intentions do not guarantee success in public policy. If government
managers or scientists neglect to match their policies with the public's understanding and wishes,
the policies will fail and the public's disenchantment with government will grow. Hence the
constant repetition of the word "process" in this article: involving the public in the comparative
risk process is both important and possible.
By conducting a scientific inquiry in a public forum with lay participants who exercise
significant control over the process, states can build something approaching a consensus on
environmental issues, a coalition that includes scientists, politicians, diverse interest groups, and

the general public. By making it possible for almost anyone to participate in the science and
analysis, the comparative risk process can take politics beyond the normal constraints of public
fads and fear.
Risk and public perception: the political context
One of the problems the comparative risk method seeks to solve is deep and difficult: there is a
large gap between the public's perception of environmental problems and the scientists'. Most
Americans are convinced that oil spills and toxic wastes are among the nation's most serious
environmental threats (Roper 1990). Many scientists say otherwise, and point instead to the risks
posed by the physical alteration of habitat, indoor air pollution, and global climate change.
Congress, like legislatures across America, has to respond to the people, not the experts. Public
policy can rarely be any more sophisticated than the public's understanding of a problem. Even
when the public and the experts want the same things - an environment that poses minimal risks
to human health and that will be rich and bountiful for generations to come - they often disagree
about what is required to attain it. America's legislative bodies have given the people what
they've asked for - the Superfund for toxic site clean-up, for example - but not necessarily what
they want.
Figure 2 illustrates the gap between the prevailing public perception of environmental problems
in Vermont and a smaller group's more informed judgment. The Vermont comparative risk
project did some informal survey work to find out what environmental problems Vermonters
worried most about and why. The results of the survey appear on the left side of the graph. The
respondents' top fear was of contaminated drinking water. Their smallest worry was indoor air
pollution and radon. The right side of the graph shows the conclusions of the Vermont project's
Public Advisory Committee, a diverse group of citizens who spent a year learning about and
comparing the risks posed to Vermont and Vermonters by the state's environmental problems.
The committee concluded that indoor air pollution and radon are among the highest-risk
problems in the state; drinking water contamination is somewhere in the middle. Not
surprisingly, the state's budget priorities are much more closely aligned with public perception
than with the advisory committee's informed judgment.

Figure 2: Two Views of Risk

Similar results have been found around the country. A Roper poll (1990) demonstrated the
divergence between the national opinion and the findings of EPA's Science Advisory Board. The
gap between the two views of risk suggests that many of America's environmental programs may
be missing the target.
When too little money and political capital is available to solve all environmental problems, it is
essential that governments select priorities as carefully as possible. The comparative risk process
is designed to help identify those priorities.
William Reilly (1991), the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
described a related management problem that plagues his agency:
"Each time a new issue appeared on the radar screen of public concern, we would unleash an
arsenal of control measures in a style reminiscent of the old 'space invaders' video game.... The
consequence of this approach is obvious to all our employees: For twenty years we have
established goals on a pollutant-by-pollutant and medium-by-medium basis without adequately
considering broader environmental quality objectives. Rarely have we evaluated the relative
importance of pollutants or environmental media-air, ecosystems and human health. Given the
scatter-shot evolution of the Agency and its missions, we were seldom encouraged to look at the
total loadings of pollutants deposited through different media from separate routes of exposure at
various locations. We have seldom if ever been directed by law to seek out the best opportunities
to reduce environmental risks, in toto, or to employ the most efficient, cost-effective
procedures."
The same is probably true in most states. In Vermont, state government had organized itself
along narrowly defined programs to address narrow pieces of environmental problems. The
program staffs focused on their pollutant, natural resource, or set of EPA rules, and often failed
to notice the consequences their fragmented efforts were having on the complex integrated

environment. A desire to change this organizational culture was one of the principal reasons
Vermont's environmental secretary initiated the state's comparative risk project.
The Vermont Agency of Natural Resources conducted one of EPA's pilot comparative risk
projects. The "Strategy for Vermont's Third Century" ran from September 1989 through
September 1991. EPA headquarters had developed the comparative risk methodology in 1986
and published its first comprehensive analysis of the nation's risks in the 1987 volume,
Unfinished Business. This product of EPA's staff scientists seemed to be such a powerful tool for
revising the agency's priorities that the agency's top managers encouraged other levels of
government to follow suit.
By 1989, three of EPA's ten regional offices had completed comparative risk projects and the
agency's Regional and State Planning Branch was pushing the other seven to do the same. These
projects were completed in 1990 and are now being used in strategic planning efforts in the
regions. Headquarters is urging the regional staffs to shift their priorities and spending away
from lower risk problems and toward higher risk problems.
EPA's independent Science Advisory Board (SAB) examined both the methods and findings of
Unfinished Business in 1989 and 1990. The SAB gave its strong endorsement to the comparative
risk approach to setting priorities in its 1990 report, Reducing Risks: Setting Priorities and
Strategies for Environmental Protection. The report concludes that the nation's environmental
priorities are failing to address many of the most serious risks. William Reilly is using these
findings, both within his agency and in Congress, to reshape EPA's agenda.
Meanwhile, EPA has encouraged states to join the movement. Colorado, Washington, and
Pennsylvania pioneered the process at the state level starting in 1987. Vermont and Louisiana
followed, with projects ending this fall. At this writing, roughly thirteen more states are set to
receive EPA grants to start comparative risk projects by the end of the year. The agency wants at
least twenty-five states to have engaged in the process by the end of 1992. (Editor's note: Maine
has plans to seek funding from EPA for its own comparative risk project. If funded, the project
would be expected to begin in 1992.) EPA is also financing comparative risk projects for the
Gulf of Mexico and in Eastern Europe.
EPA has at least two motives for spreading the word. First, it has found that one set of priorities
doesn't necessarily fit all locales. The biggest environmental risks in Vermont are not necessarily
the same as the biggest risks in Louisiana or Colorado, and it makes sense for each region or
state to target its resources toward the most locally significant problems. And second, EPA
knows that it will only be able to make dramatic changes in federal priorities if the American
people and their representatives in Congress are willing to go along. The state projects'
aggressive public participation efforts have probably reached more people than EPA's in-house
efforts ever will. State projects thus have the potential to improve environmental policy both at
home and at the national level.
Reilly (1991) put the challenge this way: "We need to improve the translation of scientific
knowledge into the vernacular of politics and public opinion, to make rational risk assessment a
part of every citizen's common sense."

The converse is also true: we need to improve the translation of public values, such as a desire
for equity, freedom from involuntary risk, aesthetic quality, and a deep commitment to future
generations, into the vernacular of the scientists and regulators in order to make the nonquantitative side of the risk equation as powerful a force in establishing standards and priorities
as are the probabilities that can be expressed as annual per capita cancer deaths. The comparative
risk process's great strength is that it can bring together all the people needed to make more
reasonable and durable policy decisions. Although technical information is sometimes difficult to
assemble and present in clear, non-technical terms, judgment is in everyone's domain.
Which risks? Which units of measurement? Who decides?
As befits any serious inquiry, a comparative risk project needs to start with questions. Some of
the questions relate to process, committee structure, and project management. Others are
technical or methodological: Which model for carcinogenesis should we use? How do we
measure ecological damage? Should we assume continued exposures at today's rates? How do
we deal with incomplete data and uncertainty? Should we estimate risks from problems such as
global climate change over which we have no jurisdiction? When calculating human health risks,
should we focus on the risks borne by those few who are most directly exposed (to hazardous
waste sites, for example) or pay more attention to the average exposures of the general public?
How much of the data should we present, and to whom? How will the information be used?
The questions above only hint at the scope of issues that need to be settled before the technical
work of a comparative risk project can begin. The questions also illustrate a more important
point: very few of the so-called technical issues are devoid of value-laden choices. Even a
decision to use EPA's method of estimating cancer risks implies the moral choice to err on the
side of overstating risks to human health when the data are uncertain.
These points raise a more fundamental question: Who should decide the various issues?
Government scientists? Appointed or elected officials? Interest group leaders?
Each project has to make these decisions for itself. What is most important is that the project
organizers approach their challenge with an understanding that the technical questions cannot be
divorced from the managerial or structural questions, nor from the broader political context or
goals for the project.
A closer look at Vermont's comparative risk project, "The Strategy for Vermont's Third
Century," will show how one set of participants wrestled with and resolved these questions.

Steps in a comparative risk project
The Vermont project had two distinct phases completed under three different administrations.
Phase 1 (1990) focused on understanding and comparing risks. Phase 2 (1991) focused on
managing risks and developing risk reduction strategies.
Setting the goals; designing a process

Vermont's project started in 1988 when Jonathan Lash, then secretary of the Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources, decided that Vermont would be able to set a more effective agenda for
environmental protection if it conducted a comparative risk project. Lash convened a day-long
work session with key officials in his agency, the Governor's Office, the Health Department and
other departments with a stake in environmental policy. The meeting demonstrated the need for
the project and created enough interdepartmental commitment to proceed. The latter was
essential because conducting the risk analysis would require substantial staff support from
throughout state government. Lash hired a director (the author of this piece) to work on the
project full time in the fall of 1989.
Lash and his colleagues set the project's basic goals:
1. to assess and compare the risks posed by Vermont's environmental problems;
2. to build a broader understanding of environmental risk among the general public; and
3. to use the technical information and public understanding to change stare government's
priorities for environmental protection and to encourage sound environmental action
outside of state government.
Lash and the director developed the following structure for the project:
1. Three technical work groups would compile and analyze data about the state's
environmental problems. The groups would look at the same set of problems from three
perspectives: risks to human health, to ecosystems, and to quality of life. The groups
would be composed of state employees from all the involved departments.
2. A steering committee, composed of the secretaries and commissioners of the involved
departments, would have formal oversight authority.
3. A 20-member Public Advisory Committee would make the most important decisions:
selecting and defining the problems to study; approving analytical methods and criteria;
and ranking the problems.
The advisory committee's job would have two parts. First, it would have to learn enough about
public attitudes and values to be able to rank the problems with confidence. Second, it would
have to help the public learn about risks and the state's environmental problems. Lash and the
director decided to give the Public Advisory Committee so much control because by creating a
strong public advisory committee, the project and its ultimate decisions had a stronger
connection with the public and a degree of credibility that could not have been achieved by a
purely "government" study. The structure worked well. The official steering committee remained
satisfied with the progress of the project and never met. The work groups and advisory
committee occasionally felt threatened by the other's power but developed considerable mutual
respect by the end of the project.
The structure's principal drawback was that it prevented the project from capitalizing on the
publicity and sense of importance that a governor can generate. Its second drawback was that it
left all decisions about how Phase 2 would be organized and managed for the new administration
to make, weakening the coherence of the project and its ability to inspire political changes.

Two tracks: technical analysis and public outreach
The participants' first challenge was to select and define Vermont's most serious environmental
problems for further study. The director and the three work groups created a single set of
carefully defined problems with minimal overlap. The work groups presented this list to the
advisory committee for consideration.
Meanwhile, the advisory committee had developed and adopted a mission statement and a public
outreach plan that included public forums, numerous other smaller events, and distribution of a
survey. The events and survey asked the public what environmental problems they were most
concerned about and why. By insisting on learning why a problem was considered serious (e.g. it
threatens the future, it is harmful to children's health, it disrupts the look of the land, etc.), the
committee developed a keener sense of Vermonters' values. This information became a vital
component of the risk ranking.
The advisory committee used the public input to modify the problem list submitted by the work
groups. Because so much depended on the problems that were included for study, the selection
required several meetings and ballots, and inspired an appeal for reconsideration by the work
groups. Eventually, everyone was sufficiently satisfied to proceed. (Figure 1 shows the problems'
titles.)
Analyzing the problems
The director helped the work groups develop their analytical approaches. He turned to earlier
comparative risk projects conducted in the states and at EPA, and to the work then being done by
the EPA's Science Advisory Board. The latter's innovations in ecosystem risks and economic
issues were particularly useful. The director also used the advisory committee's public input to
draft a set of criteria for measuring risks to Vermonters' quality of life.
The work groups and advisory committee adopted these methods and criteria before proceeding
with the analysis. The work groups assigned individual members to analyze each of the
problems. Most of the problems were investigated for risks to health, ecosystems, and quality of
life. The work groups agreed to create integrated problem reports combining all three of these
issues, something other projects had not tried. This approach encouraged work group members to
broaden their perspectives on the problems and to learn more about the ways different programs
were dealing with the same pollutants or polluters.
Some of the technical work was beyond the abilities of the Vermont teams, so members turned to
consultants selected by EPA for assistance on some problems. The teams focused their original
research on problems that required Vermont-specific investigation. On problems affecting most
of the country in similar ways, such as ozone depletion, global climate change, and indoor air
pollution, the work groups relied heavily on data that had been compiled for other projects. The
work groups tried to be as quantitative and thorough as possible. Huge data gaps and limited
time and resources for original research prevented the reports from being as rigorous and
complete as all would have wished. The work groups used their professional judgment to bridge
these gaps.

Preparing the Public Advisory Committee
Because the project would require a non-technical group, the Public Advisory Committee (and
eventually the public at large), to make decisions based on the problem reports, the director set
up a series of three training sessions. The project brought in nationally recognized experts and
teachers to work with the advisory committee, the work groups, and the public, on risks to
ecosystems, human health, and economics. The project sponsored risk communication training
for the work group members and for the advisory committee to help them better understand
technical issues and public perception.
When the work groups had completed their analyses, they spent a full weekend briefing the
advisory committee members on their findings. The advisory committee's four regional
subcommittees each held another public forum to discuss the results of the technical analysis
with the public and to learn how the public would rank some of the problems, once equipped
with the technical information.
Ranking the problems
Each of the three work groups ranked the problems and many of their subcomponents for the
risks they had studied. The groups did not attempt to combine the three rankings into an
integrated ranking. The technical groups were explicit about the criteria they used for ranking the
problems, the degree of uncertainty inherent in each ranking, and the values that guided their
interpretation of the data. With the help of an outside facilitator, the Public Advisory Committee
agreed on a process for making decisions and then made four rankings: risks to human health,
risks to ecosystems, risks to Vermonters' quality of life, and finally, an integrated ranking that
included all of the risks. (See Figure 1.) The advisory committee selected a subcommittee to
work with the director on drafting Environment 1991: Risks to Vermont and Vermonters, a
summary of the project's findings and recommendations. The report's detailed companion, the
Technical Appendix, includes the twenty technical reports and supporting documents prepared by
the work groups. The Public Advisory Committee also used the report to make several
recommendations to state government, including a basic assertion: "The primary goal of
Vermont's environmental policy should be to reduce risks to ecosystems, human health, and
Vermonters' quality of life."
Strategies to manage risks
Upon taking office in January, 1991, the Snelling administration melded Phase 2 of the
comparative risk project into a comprehensive review of all of the Agency of Natural Resource's
programs. The review was essentially an internal effort with an emphasis on improving
efficiency, eliminating unnecessary programs, and maintaining environmental quality in the face
of severe budget constraints. The concepts of risk and the information collected in Phase 1
helped guide the review and decision-making. At this writing, the immediate impact of the risk
analysis appears to be positive but still small, as should be expected in any system that tends to
make changes incrementally. The ultimate significance of the comparative risk work will be
determined in budget and policy decisions made by administrations and legislatures in years to

come. Even small annual changes in emphasis can produce significant changes in priorities in
just a few years.
The comparative risk process can generate far more dramatic changes than have so far been seen
in Vermont. The State of Washington responded to its comparative risk project's high ranking of
air pollution by enacting a comprehensive clean air law. Washington and Colorado are working
with EPA to target federal grants to address the states' higher risk problems. Vermont will
probably commence a similar negotiating process in late 1991.
Vermont's approach to Phase 2 of the comparative risk project contrasts with the aggressive
outreach efforts that Colorado, Washington, and Louisiana used to explain the risk rankings to
the public and to build a consensus for change. Washington and Louisiana hosted large and
highly successful "environmental summits" to involve the public in making risk reduction a
political priority. Louisiana's project also hosted a series of "town meetings" across the state to
bring the public directly into the decision-making.

The analysis and ranking: information and judgment
Still more choices
The comparative risk methodology is still changing, improving through innovation and better
understanding of the technical issues, and adapting to new political situations. Because there is
no "best" way to analyze environmental problems, the EPA is attempting to catalogue the most
useful alternatives in a report called the Road Map to comparative risk. It should be published by
the end of 1991. EPA hopes to standardize the process as much as possible without stifling
innovation or discouraging states from making their projects fit their own needs.
Despite the variations, a few approaches have achieved something approaching the status of rule.
The analyses measure "residual risk," not total risk or hypothetical risk. The residual risk from a
problem is that which is left over after existing environmental controls have done their job. Thus,
an analysis of the risks that raw sewage poses to the nation's surface water would first note that
virtually all sewage is treated before it reaches rivers and lakes. The discharges from the
treatment plants and from any remaining straight pipes would be the subject of a residual risk
estimate.
The focus on residual risks has benefits and drawbacks. The benefit is that it reflects, as precisely
as possible, today's reality. Analysts do not have to hypothesize about what would happen if all
those treatment plants broke down at the same time or if someone invented a better technology.
The primary drawback is that the analysis may convey the false impression that a problem
posing low risks today may be insignificant and somehow undeserving of continued public
investments in existing control strategies. It may be that maintaining those controls is the only
way to keep the problem's risks so low. A tight focus on residual risk does not require the analyst
to pay much attention to risk management: spotting ways to reduce risks or to prevent small risks
from getting worse. Of course, a thoughtful analyst will keep a list of these issues on the side.

The other almost-rule of comparative risk relates to time. Projects generally produce a snapshot
in time, a picture of the pollution and problems occurring today, rather than a dubious
extrapolation way into the future. Whether measuring risks to people or ecosystems, the projects
measure the impacts of today's pollution over the lifetime of the pollutant. Several projects have
found it useful to bend this rule. For example, most of the projects' health-risk estimates also
assume that people are exposed to today's level of pollution for a full seventy years. Most of the
projects have also weighed the future risks posed by global climate change and ozone depletion.
Other rules are more flexible still. It is up to each project to decide what problems to look at and
how. Some projects have relied exclusively on quantitative analysis; one project even succeeded
in using a computerized geographic information mapping system to analyze and display results.
Other projects have found rigorous ways to use qualitative analysis when hard data were
unavailable, and to underscore the role that judgment and values play in the technical estimation
of risks.
Health risks
Estimating health risks from environmental problems is simple in principle, yet highly uncertain
in practice. Risk is a function of the toxicity of a pollutant or "stressor," the number of people
who are exposed to the stressor, and the size and duration of each exposure. In theory, an analyst
would simply tally up all the exposure data and churn out the number of health problems that a
given environmental problem would be expected to cause in any year. A quick comparison of the
numbers would reveal which problems are most serious.
Unfortunately, the science of health risk assessment is still crude. It simply can't deliver the kind
of precision many people expect. Toxicity estimates are usually based on experiments with
laboratory animals and so may have little relevance to humans. As tenuous as these estimates
are, they don't even exist for most of the chemicals in commerce today. Further uncertainty
results from the absence of much good data about human exposures to pollutants. As a result,
even the most rigorous health assessments of a specific, well-monitored site can produce only
rough estimates of risks of human cancer and non-cancerous health effects. Comparative risk
projects must be conducted on a larger, less detailed scale than formal site-specific risk
assessments. The generalizations are broader and the degree of precision smaller.
Nevertheless, the results of such a comparison can be credible, surprising, and important. In
Vermont, for example, after looking at all the data available about Vermont's hazardous waste
sites, indoor air pollution, and surface water pollution, both the technical and lay participants
concluded that indoor air pollution is probably a much greater health threat than the other two.
Despite the uncertainties, the analysis revealed useful information that few had ever fully
considered.
Comparing health risks cannot be a completely "scientific" process. Personal or public values
must enter into many of the decisions, such as deciding which is more serious: a problem like
ground-level ozone that can reduce people's physical abilities or a problem like lead ingestion
which can reduce people's mental abilities. The panel that reviewed national health risks for the
EPA's Science Advisory Board refused to move from science to policy and make these value-

laden decisions. The challenge for state projects is to be as explicit as possible about the values
influencing the analysis and ranking. As noted above, the Vermont project's Public Advisory
Committee sought out an understanding of the public's values before it made its rankings, an
approach which was successful in Vermont.
Ecological risks
The techniques for estimating ecological risks are somewhat newer and fresher than those used
for human health. The Science Advisory Board's panel on ecological risk did an extraordinary
job in establishing useful criteria for the task.
Space and time are the keys. Analysts start by identifying the most important chemical or
physical stressors associated with each environmental problem, and then estimate the stressors'
impact on exposed ecosystems. (These steps are analogous to estimating health risks.) Analysts
try to determine the size of the area affected by the stressor and how long it would take the
ecosystem to recover from the damage if the stress were removed.
Some problems hyped as ecological disasters by the media cause only localized, short-term
damage to ecosystems. A typical chemical spill in a river, for example, may radically change the
life in and around a few miles of the stream, but leave no trace of damage just a few years later.
Ozone depletion or global climate change, in contrast, may change ecosystems worldwide and
take centuries to recover from, if recovery is possible at all. Species extinctions are permanent, of
course, and some local changes - such as the elimination of migratory waterfowl habitat - can
affect ecosystems across an entire continent. The space-time or extent-reversibility criteria
provide a solid foundation for more detailed analysis.
Perhaps the biggest challenge in estimating and comparing ecological risks is keeping people and
their values out of the picture. Considerations of the relative worth of sport fish versus other less
tasty species are inappropriate here and can skew conclusions about environmental health.
Natural resources are important to people for many reasons, and each comparative risk project
ought to measure risks to resources on which people's jobs and emotional well being depend.
These calculations belong in their own section, however. The two most-often-used names for this
kind of analysis are "welfare" and "quality of life."
Risks to people's quality of life
Environmental problems that make people sick degrade people's quality of life. So do
environmental problems that make it impossible to fish, swim, or hunt. So do problems that
degrade the aesthetic quality of the environment by filling the air with haze or odors or
eliminating the sound of songbirds. So do problems that put people out of work, or require them
to spend their savings to replace water supplies, repaint their houses, or repair flood damage. So
do problems that threaten the well being of future generations.
Measuring these costs is probably the most problematic part of the comparative risk process.
EPA's own projects have typically either avoided any "welfare" analysis or considered only a

handful of direct economic costs, such as the materials damage, crop losses, and health-care
costs caused by various pollutants.
This narrow approach leaves out too much to be considered sufficient. It tends to undervalue or
ignore anything not currently traded on financial markets - anything without an obvious price.
Worse, because the approach usually yields a number preceded by a dollar sign, the damage
estimates appear to be precise, concrete and meaningful, when they are none of these. Some
projects, including Vermont's, have pushed the scope of the welfare analysis into a more
comprehensive, albeit qualitative, analysis. The approach makes scientists and some economists
nervous but makes perfect sense to anyone who has dealt with public opinion.
After talking with Vermonters about environmental problems, the project's Public Advisory
Committee adopted seven criteria by which it would measure each problem's impact on the
quality of Vermonters' lives: aesthetics, recreation, economic well-being, fairness, future
generations, sense of community, and peace of mind. The information that supported the analysis
ranged from precise numbers, including the number of people-days for which boil-water orders
were in effect in a year, to softer polling data showing how intensely Vermonters felt about the
quality of their visual landscape.
Perhaps because the analysts did not convey their findings as precise, concrete, or
comprehensive, they were meaningful. The analysis of Vermont's solid waste problem, for
example, pointed out that the problems with landfills are not so much their impact on human
health or the environment, but on aesthetics, fairness, and peace of mind. The project's
participants had no trouble ranking the state's problems based on these criteria and analyses.
Although much of the information was relatively subjective, it still helped the committees make
more informed judgments.
Integrating rankings
Figure 1 shows Vermont's four ranking lists. The last column is the most important: the
integrated ranking. Most of the comparative risk projects sponsored by EPA have not produced
an integrated ranking because the participants couldn't figure out how to do it scientifically. No
formula seemed to work. (Should health be weighted twice as much as ecology, or half as
much?) This reluctance to resort to a formula is wise, though the notion that dissimilar risks or
priorities "can't be combined" is disproved every time a legislature passes a budget.
The only rule that seems appropriate for making an integrated ranking is to be as deliberate and
explicit as possible. People should be able to see which values the decision-makers considered
most important. The corollary to the rule is also important: the project should not claim that the
integrated ranking is wholly "scientific."
Setting environmental priorities
Having completed a comparative risk analysis and ranking, the challenge for state governments
is to use the results to achieve their policy goals. A sharp focus on risk can improve the
effectiveness of some traditional management tools.

Strategic planning is perhaps the most important tool in the manager's arsenal. The planning
process requires managers to be clear about their goals and objectives, to understand their
position and options, and then to take steps to achieve their objectives. The final step, monitoring
the results and adjusting accordingly, takes the process back to the beginning. The comparative
risk analysis can be the intellectual foundation for a strategic planning process. It can show
where action is needed and suggest the best ways to accomplish goals. The risks that are
measured today can be the monitored indicators that will show success or failure tomorrow.
Enthusiasts of comparative risk presume that most states consider it important to reduce or at
least manage environmental risks. Nowhere can risk reduction be the only goal, however.
Keeping down taxes, social costs, and government intrusion into private affairs are also widely
held goals. So too are economic development, social equity, expanding recreational
opportunities, and preserving traditional industries and agriculture. After conducting a
comparative risk project, participants may decide to modify those goals. The EPA's Science
Advisory Board, for example, concluded its work with a recommendation that EPA start giving
risks to ecosystems at least as much attention as it has given risks to human health.
Accomplishing any of these goals requires specific actions, and it is when policymakers get
down to details that the comparative risk results become most useful. In addition to the risk
ranking, the analysis will have produced an organized, up-to-date body of information about the
status of the state's environment and environmental problems. Thus, the analysis can show where
to start looking for places to save money without substantially increasing risk, or to spend more
money to reduce risks of various kinds. Reference to the analysis can clarify the tradeoffs
between conflicting goals, such as aesthetic protection, recreation, and public spending.
The analysis can show where different strategies will be most effective. Problems caused by a
small number of polluters will require management strategies different from problems caused by
nearly everyone. And problems that the public already understands and wants fixed will demand
different treatment from problems, such as radon, to which the public is currently indifferent.
Regulation may work best for the former, while education may be the only useful risk-reduction
strategy for the latter.
The same conceptual tools and rigor that make it possible to compare risks also can help
policymakers compare risk-reduction strategies to determine which are the most desirable to
implement. A useful approach is to list a number of alternative approaches to managing a
particular risk, and then to compare the alternatives' likely costs and benefits in terms related
directly to the risk estimates. There is no magic formula in this process, only informed judgment.
The process looks radical only when compared to the more typical approaches to budgeting and
problem-solving: hiring freezes and across-the-board spending reductions that treat all people
and programs as equals, or tinkering with staffing levels within bureaucratically defined
programs. One of the advantages of looking for ways to reduce or manage risks rather than
merely adjusting program budgets is that the effort encourages policy-makers to consider the full
range of impacts that a policy might have on ecosystems, people, and government.
Another advantage of focusing on risks is that it opens the door to innovative, non-regulatory
approaches to environmental protection and risk reduction. Comparative risk projects are

showing that many of the big remaining risks facing America are caused by the small
environmental insults caused by millions of individuals, rather than by a few large industries.
The old "command-and-control" regulatory approaches either will not work against these
remaining problems or will prove to be pointlessly inefficient. Relatively new tools, such as
market-based incentives, cooperative pollution-prevention strategies, and the aggressive use of
public information, can accomplish more good for less.

A useful tool
If cost were no object, no one would need to worry about comparative risk. State legislatures and
Congress could simply pass laws requiring society to pay whatever it takes to eliminate all
environmental problems once and for all. Because that day will never come, individuals and their
governments should try to get as much environmental protection as possible for their money. The
comparative risk process can help make that happen.
The process offers no miracle cures, no easy consensus or mass conversion to altruism. The
process doesn't even guarantee wisdom or certainty. The process does provide a way to make
today's political systems work better: it allows more people access to more information; it
encourages more people to debate fundamental issues of equity, safety, and the future; it
provides a framework for making judgments, reaching agreements, and turning them into action.
In short, the comparative risk process will not replace contentious democracy with a universally
accepted Scientific Truth. Rather, the process gives democracy a chance to use scientific
understanding for all it's worth.
Richard A. Minard is director of the Northeast Center for Comparative Risk at the
Environmental Law Center, Vermont Law School. He has served as Director, Strategy for
Vermont's Third Century, and as Director, Office of Policy Research and Coordination for
Vermont Governor Kunin.
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